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1.

INTRODUCTION

In some New Jersey school districts the physical condition of the
educational facilities is so deficient that the constitutional right to a
thorough and efficient education' is threatened. Learning cannot
occur in an atmosphere of physical decay; and the educational process
will be severely impaired unless such deplorable conditions are rectified. In fact, in Upper Freehold Township Regional School District
the physical facilities were so grossly inadequate that the Supreme
Court of New Jersey upheld an order of the State Commissioner of
Education directing the school district to issue bonds for the purpose
of repairing the school.2 The court thus protected what it felt was the
students' right to a thorough and efficient education despite the fact
that the voters had twice refused to authorize the needed repairs.
Upper Freehold is not alone. There is approximately a three billion
dollar backlog of capital improvement projects for public education
facilities in the state, 3 and ninety-one percent of all New Jersey school
districts are unable to issue school bonds without voter approval. 4 Yet,
there is increasing evidence of significant voter reluctance to approve
educational expenditures. 5 As a result, the need for voter approval
may impair the ability of school boards to comply with the constitutional mandate to provide a thorough and efficient education. Alternative methods of financing under existing New Jersey law should be
considered. In particular, financing through a county improvement
• A.B., Rutgers College, J.D., Rutgers Law School-Newark; Associate, Riker, Danzig,
Scherer & Hyland, Newark, New Jersey.
B.S., College of St. Elizabeth; J.D., Seton Hall University School of Law (anticipated).
N.J. CONsr. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1.
2 In re Upper Freehold Regional School Dist., 86 N.J. 265, 430 A.2d 905 (1981).
3 NEw JEnsLy STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1979-1980).
4 Letter from Melvin L. Wyns, Assistant Director, Bureau of School Finance, to Jean
LaMaita (Nov. 2, 1981).
5 According to figures supplied by the New Jersey School Boards Association, the statewide
school budget rejection rate has grown from an average of 18.6% in 1977 to 36.2% in 1981.
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authority may have potential application in the school financing context.
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A

THOROUGH AND EFFICIENT EDUCATION

The Constitution of the State of New Jersey mandates that students enrolled in state public schools receive a "thorough and efficient" education. Specifically, the constitution provides that:
The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support
of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the
instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of five
and eighteen years. 6
The Supreme Court of New Jersey strictly enforced this constitutional
7
directive in Robinson v. Cahill.
The plaintiffs in Robinson were local taxpayers, public school

students, and educational administrators who objected to the ad valorem tax system used to fund public education in New Jersey. 8 The
plaintiffs maintained that there was a direct correlation between the
amount of money spent per pupil and the resulting educational benefits. Accordingly, the plaintiffs asserted that students in property-poor

school districts were being deprived of a thorough and efficient education. 9 The supreme court concurred in this analysis and ordered the
legislature to revise the funding process so that all students might
obtain that level of education necessary for them to participate effec-

tively in the political and economic system. 10

Thus, the supreme

court established New Jersey as the first state to find that wealth-related disparities in educational funding are violative of state constitutional provisions." A review of previous funding disputes is helpful
in understanding the monumental significance of this decision.

6 N.J.

CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1.

7 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (Robinson I), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976, aff'd on rehearing.
jurisdiction retained, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973) (Robinson 1I). order entered, 67 N.J. 35.
335 A.2d 6 (Robinson III), order entered, 67 N.J. 333, 339 A.2d 193, republished. 69 N.J. 133.
351 A.2d 713 (1975) (Robinson IV), order vacated, 69 N.J. 449, 335 A.2d 129 (1976) (Robinson
V), injunction issued, 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (Robinson VI), injunction dissolved, 70 N.J.
464, 360 A.2d 400 (1979) (Robinson VII).
8 The students contended that the state had not fulfilled its constitutional obligations while
the taxpayers and the educational administrators contested the disproportionate effect of the ad
valorem property tax system and the inequitable amount of power wielded by local districts.
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 21-22, 37, 43, 53-54, 57-58, Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J.
Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (Law Div. 1972).
9 62 N.J. at 481, 303 A.2d at 287.
10 Id. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295.
1 Levin, Current Trends in School Finance Reform Litigation:A Commentary. 1977 DUKE
L.J. 1099.
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In 1971 the Supreme Court of California held in Serrano v.
Priest'2 that differences in educational opportunities which are a
function of district wealth contravene the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.13 The
court recommended that California adopt a system of educational
financing in which the level of expenditure per pupil is not based on
"'the resources of his school district and ultimately upon the pocketbook of his parents." 14

Following the Serrano decision, similar litigation was commenced in almost every state' 5 and nine decisions were published.' 6
This flurry of litigation was quickly halted when the United States
Supreme Court in Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School
District'7 decided that using property tax revenues to finance public
schools does not discriminate against a suspect class because the
alleged objects of discrimination are not poor persons but simply
districts with low or "poor" property values.' 8 The opinion distinguished previous wealth classification decisions by emphasizing that
in those instances the discrimination had arisen because of disparities
in personal wealth.' 9 Additionally, the Court noted that wealth is a
discriminatory criterion only when used to absolutely deprive the
20
indigent of some "desired benefit" or "meaningful opportunity."
11 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), later appealed, 18 Cal. 3d 728,
557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
'1 5 Cal. at 590, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
14 Id. at 614, 487 P.2d at 1263, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
IsLevin, supra note 11, at 1101.
'" See Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Md. 1972): Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep.
School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Van Dusartz v.
Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Hollins v. Shofstall, No. C-253652 (Ariz. Super. Ct.
June 1, 1972), rev'd. 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973); Caldwell v. Kansas, No. 50616 (Johnson
County Dist. Ct., Kan. Aug. 30, 1972); Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972),
vacated, 390 Mich. 389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287
A.2d 187 (1972), supplemented in 119 N.J. Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (1972), affd as"modified, 62
N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973); Spano v. Board of Educ., 68 Misc. 2d 804, 328 N.Y.S.2d 229
(Sup. Ct. 1972); Sweetwater County Planning Comm'n v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971),
jurisdiction relinquished, 493 P.2d 1050 (Wyo. 1972).
17411 U.S. 1 (1973).
16 Id. at 28. The Court was not persuaded that the "poorest people" were "concentrated" in
all the "poorest districts." Id. at 22-23. The Court also emphasized that:
The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of the
traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.
Id. at 28.
' See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
10411 U.S. at 19-20.
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The Court found that the discrimination complained of in Rodriguez
caused no such deprivation but merely produced differences in the

quality of education offered. 2 1 Further, the Court noted that education is not explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution,
consequently, it cannot be deemed a fundamental right.22 Once the
Court had decided that education is not a fundamental right and that
property value is not a suspect classification, it could not apply the

strict scrutiny test of the equal protection clause.

3

Accordingly, the

majority examined the financing scheme using the rational basis
standard 24 and concluded that the Texas system logically effectuated
the legitimate state interest of encouraging "'alarge measure of partic25
ipation in and control of each district's schools at the local level."

After the Rodriguez decision foreclosed equal protection avenues
for achieving reform of school financing practices, various suits commenced in state forums were based on state constitutional provisions
governing free public education.26 The Robinson decision, which
2' Id. at 23.
22 Id. at 37.
23 Id. at 40. The strict scrutiny test is applied to laws which discriminate on the basis of
"suspect classifications" such as race, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). supp. op..
349 U.S. 294 (1955); and, national origin, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). The Court
will only uphold such legislation if there is a compelling state interest for the classification. J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 524 (1978).
24 The rational basis standard examines allegedly discriminatory laws to see if the state has
chosen reasonably neutral standards to accomplish its objectives. If there is a logical nexus
between the means chosen and the desired end, then the law will be upheld. Young v. American
Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (zoning ordinance restricting location of adult theatres
held constitutionally permissible); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (aptitude test
which effectively measures skills of job candidates may be administered even though it may have
racially discriminatory overtones).
25 411 U.S. at 49.

26 The constitutional provisions of the fifty states are excellently summarized in Levin, supra

note 11, at 1103 n.18. Ms. Levin reports that:
Almost all state constitutions contain an express provision guaranteeing a free
public education, although the language varies from state to state. Eight states
mandate a thorough and efficient system of free public schools. MD. CONsT. art.
VIII, § 1; MINN. CONT. art. VIII, § 3; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1;OHIO
CONST. art. VI, § 2; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; S.D. CONsT. art. VIII, § 15; W. VA.
CONST. art. XII, § 1; Wyo. CONST. art. VII, § 9; see OFFICE OF EDUCATION, U.S.

DEr. OF

HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
AND SELECTED LEGAL MATERIALS RELATING TO PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE (DHEW Pub.

No. (OE) 73-00002, 1973).
Another seven states use either 'thorough' or 'efficient.' ARK.CONST. art. XIV, §

I (efficient); COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (thorough); DEL. CONSr. art. X, § I
(efficient); IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1 (thorough); ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (efficient);
Ky. CONST. § 183 (efficient); TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (efficient)....
Eight states mandate a 'general and uniform' public school system. Aasz.

CONST. art. XI, § 1; IDAHO CONsT. art. IX, § 1;IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1;MINN.
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was handed down only a few weeks after Rodriguez, became the
2
seminal opinion in the area of school finance reform litigation. 1
The Robinson court disposed of the federal equal protection issue
by deferring to the Supreme Court opinion in Rodriguez; however,
the court recognized that state equal protection standards could be
more exacting than their federal counterparts. The court then carefully analyzed the state constitutional guarantee of a free public
education. 8 The plaintiffs claimed that the constitutional mandate
prohibits the state from delegating the fiscal responsibility for the
schools to local municipalities. 29 After examining the history of the
constitutional provision, 30 the court was unable to conclude that the
drafters intended to guarantee absolute equality among the various
taxpayers of the state. 31 Accordingly, the court did not hold that the
constitutional provisions could only be fulfilled through the imposition of a statewide tax. 32 Nevertheless, Chief Justice Weintraub
noted:
Whether the State acts directly or imposes the role upon local
government, the end product must be what the Constitution commands. A system of instruction in any district of the State which is
not thorough and efficient falls short of the Constitutional command. Whatever the reason for the violation, the obligation is the
3
State's to rectify it.'
CONsT. art. VIII, § 1;N.C. CONsT. art. IX, § 2(1); On. CONST. art. VII, § 3; S.D.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2....
Ten states guarantee either a 'general' or a 'uniform' system. Aax. CONST. art.
XIV, § I (general); CoLo. CONsT. art. IX, § 2 (uniform); DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1
(general): FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (uniform); KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (uniform);
N-,. CONST. art. XI, § 2 (uniform); N.M. CONsT. art. XII, § I (uniform); N.D.
CONsT. art. VIII, § 148 (uniform); UTAH CONSTr. art. X, § I (uniform); WVo.
CoNsr. art. VII, § 1 (uniform)....
Many states use more than one of these descriptive phrases. See, e.g., Idaho:
"Ilt shall be the duty of the legislature of Idaho to establish and maintain a general,
uniforn and thorough system of public, free common schools." IDAHo CONST. art,
IX, § 1 (emphasis added).
The remaining states have education clauses more limited in nature, such as
those which mandate the provision of a "system of common schools" or "a public
educational system." See. e.g., CAL. CONs'r. art. IX, § 5; IOWA CONST. art. IX, 2d §
7; LA. CONST. Art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
Id.
" Levin, supra note 11, at 1100.
* 62 N.J. at 501-08, 303 A.2d at 287-92.
2. Id. at 502, 303 A.2d at 288.
Id. at 501-08, 303 A.2d at 287-92.
31Id. at 513, 303 A.2d at 294.
32

Id.

3

Id.
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The Chief Justice then held that the state is required to identify those
municipalities that have not complied with the constitutional directives. If it is clear that assistance is needed, the state must step in and
34
insure that adequate education is available.
The court did not decide that the same quality of instruction
must be provided to every child in the state but ruled that the state
constitution guarantees every student "[t]hat educational opportunity

which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his
role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor market." 35 In so
holding, the court recognized that the crucial factor for determining

whether an educational system is thorough and efficient is not solely
the money spent by the district but also the level of achievement
attained by its pupils. 36 Applying this standard to the facts proferred

by the plaintiffs, the court found that the present system did not fulfill
the constitutional mandate and ordered the state to devise a more

equitable scheme for the financing of public education.37
Five years after suit was first filed remedial legislation was put
into effect. The Public School Education Act of 197538 codifies the
legislature's commitment to establish uniform statewide achievement
levels for basic educational skills and to provide sufficient funding so
that the objectives will be reached in all communities. 3 The Act

3' Id. at 513, 303 A.2d at 294. The Chief Justice based this conclusion upon the fact that the
tax imposed by the local districts is in reality a tax for state use since it is the state's obligation to
provide a free public education. Id. at 503, 303 A.2d at 288-89. In effect, the local governments
act as "an arm of the State" in performing this important function. Id. at 502, 303 A.2d at 288.
35 Id. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295.
6 Id. at 514, 303 A.2d at 294 (quoting Landis v. Ashworth School Dist. No.44, 57 N.J.L.
509, 512, 31 A. 1017, 1018 (1885)).
37 Id. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295. After further argument, however, the supreme court decided
that it would not invalidate the existing statutory system unless the legislature failed to enact new
laws by December 31, 1974. Robinson v. Cahill, 63 N.J. 196, 198. 306 A.2d 65, 66 (1973)
(Robinson II). When the legislature was still undecided as of January, 1975, the court decided
that no changes would be implemented during the 1975-1976 school year. Robinson v. Cahill, 67
N.J. 35, 37, 335 A.2d 6, 7 (1975) (Robinson III). Subsequently, the court enacted provisional
remedies under the appropriations clause of the state constitution, N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
para. 2, so that compliance would be achieved in 1976-1977. Robinson v. Cahill. 67 N.J. 333,
348, 339 A.2d 193, 200 (1975) (Robinson IV). The controversy was finally resolved when the
court upheld the validity of the Public School Education Act of 1975, N.J. STAT. ANN. §
18A:7A-1 to 33 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982), the corrective legislation ultimately adopted by
the legislature, and issued an injunction restraining public school officials from expending any
moneys for the support of public schools until the new act was fully funded. Robinson v. Cahill,
70 N.J. 155, 159-60, 358 A.2d 457 (1976) (Robinson V). The injunction was dissolved in July of
1976 when funding was finally assured by the legislature. Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 464,
458-59, 360 A.2d 400 (1976) (Robinson VI).
38 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7A-1 to 33 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
39 Id. § 18A:7A-2 (b)(3)(6). Recently, the Public School Education Act of 1975 was challenged for allegedly failing to comply with the constitutional mandate for a thorough and
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includes a new equalization formula which is designed to insure that
needy school districts receive an adequate amount of state aid to
compensate for low tax bases. 40 This procedure is employed in order
to reserve a sufficient amount of local control and encourage citizen
involvement in education expenditures. The Act continues the practice of local taxation and decision-making. 41 Nonetheless, the statute
requires that the state board monitor the progress of each district
through the submission of annual reports 42 and the periodic review of
43
state goals and standards.

III.

THE OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE EDUCATIONAL
FACILITIES

The most significant impact of the Robinson decision has been in

the area of state aid to public education and concomitant attempts to
alleviate the local property tax burden through the imposition of a
state income tax. 44 Although not specifically addressed in Robinson,

the court in In re Upper FreeholdRegional School District45 examined
the relationship between the physical adequacy of educational facilities and the right to a thorough and efficient education. Essential to

efficient education. In Abbott v. Burke, No. C-1893-80 (N.J. filed Feb. 5, 1981), the class action
plaintiffs claimed that the current method for calculating state aid to school districts violates
both the education clause of the New Jersey Constitution and the equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 3, Abbott v. Burke, No. C-189380 (N.J. filed Feb. 5, 1981). The plaintiffs based this conclusion on their assertion that the
"allocation of resources and educational opportunity under the New Jersey school finance system
is based on criteria which are not substantially related to education, but rather is not based on
such educationally irrelevant factors as local taxable wealth and arbitrarily determined funding
limitations." Id. at 35.
In addition to citing deficiencies in special and bilingual instructions, staffing, and administration, the plaintiffs also alleged that the physical condition of the schools located in property
poor districts was far from adequate. Quoting the Foun YEAR AssEssMENT OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL
EDUCATION AcT OF 1975, Vol. I, at 89 [hereinafter cited as FouR YE.R AssEssNmENT], the plaintiffs
posited that the funds already provided to repair and renovate the urban schools are barely
adequate. Further, the plaintiffs claimed that many schools in their districts (East Orange,
Camden, Irvington and Jersey City) "are unfit for occupation." Plaintiff's Amended Complaint,
supra, at 31. Moreover, the litigants reported that "[in 1978-79, county monitors cited 99
districts for failing to provide facilities that are clean, attractive, and in good repair, and 74
districts which were without acceptable institutional materials and equipment." Id. (relying on
FoUn YEAR AssEssMENT, supra, at 85). Plainly, the Abbott complaint indicated that there are
many school districts in dire need of repair and renovation.
40 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7A-18 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
11 Id. § 18A:7A-2(a)(7).
42 Id. § 18A:7A-I1.
41 Id. § 18A:7A-8.
44 Id. § 54A:1-1, :10-12.
4"86 N.J. 265, 430 A.2d 905 (1981).
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an understanding of this relationship is a review of current methods of
funding public school capital improvements.
A. Current Methods of Financing Public
School CapitalImprovements
The current methods used to finance public school facilities are
rather complex and variegated. The specific technique which a school
district uses to issue bonds is determined by its status as either a Type I
or Type II school district. 46 Type I school districts primarily include
those districts which are established in cities or municipalities that

4s According to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:21-1 (West 1968). a school board may undertake
capital projects through levying taxes or issuing bonds. The capital improvements which may be
financed in this manner include:
1. The acquisition by purchase or condemnation of lands:

2. The grading, draining and landscaping of lands owned or to be acquired by the
board and the improvements thereof in any like manner:
3. The acquisition, construction, reconstruction, remodeling, alteration, enlargement or major repair of buildings, and
4. The purchase of the original furniture, equipment and apparatus, or of major
renewals of furniture, equipment and apparatus, for any building used or to be
used for such purposes.
Id.
Both Type I and Type II districts may employ the security mechanisms provided by the
Qualified School Bond Act. Id. § 18A:24-85 to 97. Under the terms of that Act a school board
may apply to the Commissioner of Education to have the bonds of the district qualified by the
State Board of Education. Id. § 18A:24-88(c). Once the Commissioner is satisfied that the school
district needs the proceeds of the bonds to finance improvements guaranteeing a thorough and
efficient education, he will recommend that the state board issue a resolution approving the
issuance of the bonds. Id. § 18A:24-88(b) & (c). The State Treasurer then withholds a sufficient
amount of the municipality's state school aid to cover the debt service on the bonds. Id. §
18A:24-93(a). The State Treasurer forwards the requisite funds to the paying agent. Id.
As security for the bondholders, the State of New Jersey covenants with the purchasers not
to take any action which would create a lien on or deduction from the municipality's state aid:
however, the state does not promise that it will never repeal or limit the statutes authorizing state
aid for schools. Id. § 18A:24-93(b).
Finally, the Act does not relieve school districts or municipalities of the obligation to
continue to budget sums sufficient to pay principal and interest on the bonds. To the extent that
these sums are not needed because of the contribution of state aid the school district must use the
moneys to cover other operating expenses. Id. § 18A:24-94.
There is one other security mechanism which school districts may employ when issuing
debt. A school district may apply to the Division of Local Finance in the Department of
Community Affairs for a certificate approving the issuance of the bonds and ascertaining that
they are valid and binding obligations of the school board or guaranteeing municipality. Id. §
18A:24-67. The aggregate amount of bonds financed in this manner may not exceed 1.5 times
the amount of debt which the issuer is already authorized to borrow for school purposes. Id. §
18A:24-70(a). The municipality then issues a blanket bond payable to the paying agent which
does not state a dollar amount but which is "a binding obligation to pay the amount of the
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become cities,47 whereas
Type II districts exist in all municipalities
48
other than cities.

School bonds may be issued by a municipality or a school district
after they have been authorized by the appropriate authorities. 4 In
Type II districts there are different procedures for districts that have a
board of school estimate 5 and those that do not. In a Type II district
that has a board of school estimate, bonds are authorized for issuance
as soon as the board of education in the district adopts a final resolution which has been approved by "a recorded roll call majority vote of
the full membership." 5' In addition, the board must finalize the
amount of money required for a given capital project 52 and submit
53
documentation of the plan to the attorney general for his approval.

principal and accrued interest on all bonds issued and outstanding at any time." Id. § 18A:2470(b). The bonds are then issued in registered form only. Id. § 18A:24-70(d). The principal
amount of the bonds issued under this optional method may not exceed $250,000.00 or an
average of not more than $25.00 per person based on the population of the district. Id. §
18A:24-77.
" Id. § 18A:9-2.
4S Id. § 18A:9-3. The provisions governing Type II school districts also apply to those districts
which are considered regional districts under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:13-1 (W est 1968). Should
the legal voters of either type of district desire to alter their selection they may do so in a public
election after a petition signed by at least 15% of their number has been filed with the municipal
clerk. Id. § 18A:9-4.
41 In Type I school districts the board of education is to consist of either five or seven
members in accordance with municipal ordinances; however, districts located in "cities of the
first class" are to have a nine member board. Id. § 18A:12-6 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). In
Type I districts the boards of education are appointed by the mayor or other chief executive
officer of the city. Id. § 18A:12-7 (West 1968). Similarly, Type II districts located in towns with
a population of 10,000 or more which had appointed boards in 1968 may continue to appoint its
members pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 12-16 (West 1968), or hold an election at which all
legal voters in the municipality may be asked if they prefer to have an elected board. Id. §
18A:12-18. All other Type II school board members are elected to their positions pursuant to
N.J. STAT. AN . § 18A:12-10 (West 1968), and both species of Type II districts may have three,
five, seven, or nine members. See id. § 18A:12-10, -11, -11.1.
Type II districts are required to have a board of school estimate only if the district had a
board of school estimate in 1949 when the statute was enacted and if the territorial limits of the
district incorporate more than one municipality with a combined population over 10,000. Id. §
18A:22-3. In a Type II district the board of school estimate consists of all chief executive officers
of governments within the district, the president of each board of education and two members of
each governing body. Id. § 18A:22-4. The board is empowered to take action only if a majority
of the members from each municipality is present. Id. § 18A:22-5. All Type I school districts are
required to have a board of school estimate as provided in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:22-1 (West
Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). The members of the board of school estimate include two representatives from the board of education, two members of the municipal governing body, and the chief
executive officer of the city. Id.
"' Id. § 18A:24-10(b).
"2 Id. § 18A:24-12 (West 1968).
5' Id. § 18A:24-30.
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The bonds can then only be sold at a public sale after at least seven
54
days notice in a municipal bond publication.
In contrast, a Type II school district without a board of school
estimate may authorize the issuance of bonds only after holding both a
recorded roll call of the full board of education and an election for all
legal voters. 55 The voting may be conducted through a general,
special, or municipal election which must be held no sooner than
forty-one days after the governing body has passed an ordinance
authorizing the issuance of the bonds. 58
In a Type I school district, once the board of estimate has received notice of the planned project 57 and certified the amount of
money it deems necessary to accomplish the stated objectives, 58 the
governing body of the municipality adopts an ordinance approving
the bonds. 59 The principal amount of the bonds is limited according
to the number of grade levels of instruction which the district provides
or will provide; 60 however, there is no requirement that the issuance

Id. § 18A:24-36.
5s Id. § 18A:24-10(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). The voter approval requirement also
applies to regional Type II school districts. Id. In addition, the statute provides that school bonds
may not be issued without voter approval by any district, Type I or Type II, whose by-laws,
ordinances, or other governing rules require voter approval for the issuance of bonds. Id.
50 Id. § 18A:24-29 (West 1968). Furthermore, the clerk of the municipality must post at least
seven notices providing details of the referendum as well as publish notice in a newspaper with
municipal or county-wide circulation no less than seven days before the election. Id.
57Id. § 18A:22-18.
18 Id. § 18A:22-19.
So Id. § 18A:24-11.
0 Id. § 18A:24-19 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). School bonds may be issued for a principal
amount which exceeds the limits set forth in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:24-19 (West Cum. Supp.
1981-1982), if the issue receives the approval of the Commissioner of Education and the local
finance board as well as affirmative support from all legal voters in the district. Id. § 18A:24-23.
According to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:24-26 (West 1968), the Commissioner is empowered to
consent to the offering if he is convinced that "existing educational facilities in the district are, or
within five years will be, less than 80% adequate" and that the proposed additions or improvements will be fully utilized within ten years. Id. Similarly, under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:24-27
(West 1968), the local finance board is authorized to grant approval to the bonds if it is
convinced that the district is planning to spend a reasonable sum which will not impair its credit
or its ability to meet principal and interest payments on all its debts. Id. In addition, the finance
board must ascertain that the school district will be able to bring its debt limit within statutory
limits at some point during the ensuing twenty years. Id. Finally, in issuing school bonds the
Type I school district must comply with the provisions contained in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:49-1
to 27 (West 1967 & Cum. Supp. 1981-1982) (governing form of ordinances and resolutions) and
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27-1 to 66 (West 1975) (governing procedures and function of Municipal
Finance Commission). Id. § 18A:24-11 (West 1968). As part of the process of issuing the bonds
the school district must also prepare a supplemental debt statement which identifies all of the
district's bonds and notes that are issued and outstanding or authorized but not yet issued. Id. §
18A:24-16 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). The supplemental debt statement also reveals the
effect of the proposed issue on the district's other obligations. Id.
'
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of school bonds be approved by the voters. After the Type I district
bonds have received all of the necessary approvals they must be sold in
compliance with the local bond law. 6 ' In effect, Type I school bonds
are no different than all other municipal obligations 2 because any
private sale which is effectuated must be confirmed by a two-thirds
63
majority of the entire municipal governing body.
B. In Re Upper Freehold Regional School District:

The Power of the State to Order Capital Improvements
1. The Freehold Decision
In In re Upper Freehold Regional School District,6 4 the Supreme
Court of New Jersey conclusively ruled that the Commissioner and the
State Board of Education are empowered to order a Type II school
district without a board of school estimate to issue bonds to fund
necessary capital improvements even when the voters have explicitly
rejected such a course of action.65

The Freeholdcontroversy centered on the extreme state of disrepair at Allentown High School, a school maintained by the Upper
Freehold Regional School District.6 8 The high school, which was

built in 1963, is attended by about 1,000 students. In 1975, school

" Id. § 40A:2-1 to 64 (West 1980).

82 School bonds are 'full faith and credit" obligations entitled to the benefit of the ad
valorem taxing power of the constituent municipalities. See id. § 18A:24-27 (West 1968). Like
other general obligations, school bonds may be refunded at or prior to maturity. Id. § 18A:2461.1 (West Cum.Supp. 1981-1982). In a Type I district, refunding bonds may be issued in any
amount which the governing body deems necessary. Id. In a Type II district, the Board of
Education certifies the size of the issue and the Local Finance Board grants the final approval for
the refunding. Id. Should the Finance Board disapprove the issue it must provide the Board of
Education with its reason for doing so. Id. § 18A:24-61.7.
The refunding process is extremely beneficial to municipalities and school districts that wish
to retire debt which had been issued at an unusually high rate of interest or before the enactment
of the Qualified School Bond Act. Id. § 18A:24-85 to 97. Moreover, the refunding process is
attractive to issuers because the legislature has provided that refunding bonds "shall be excluded
in calculating the net school debt of a municipality or district." Id. § 18A:24-61.2. Naturally,
refunding bonds must be issued in compliance with the provisions of local bond law. Id. §
18A:24-61.3 (citing id. § 40A:2-52 to 60). In addition, there are no marketing restrictions on
refunding issues and thus the bonds may be sold at public or private sale. Id. § 18A:24-61.
13Id. § 40A:2-27 (West 1980). The bonds must be sold at public sale unless the principal
amount of the issue is less than $20,000 or no legally acceptable bid is received at an advertised
public offering. Id.
86 N.J. 265, 430 A.2d 905 (1981).
Id. at 279, 430 A.2d at 913.
I'
06 Id. at 268, 430 A.2d at 907. The district is comprised of the towns of Freehold and
Allentown. Three additional municipalities send their students to the high school but do not
belong to the district. Id.
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district officials began to notice that the building exhibited severe
structural defects, including cracked floors, an improperly angled
roof, and warped, irregular windows.6 7 Over the next three years the
building's deficiencies became increasingly apparent. A 1978 inspection by the Monmouth County Superintendent of Schools and the
chief safety consultant of the New Jersey Department of Education
revealed considerable water damage and predicted that the defective
windows would shatter during a storm. In accordance with statutory
mandates for a Type II district, 68 the Board of Education arranged for
a special referendum to be submitted to the voters. The Board sought
approval for funds to both repair the facility and build an addition to
it or, in the alternative, an amount sufficient only to accomplish the
necessary repair work. Both proposals were defeated by the voters."'
During the following school year conditions at the high school
substantially worsened. Large industrial drums were installed to
catch rain leaking through the roof. On very stormy days classes were
held in the auditorium and the cafeteria. The water caused rotting of
the columns and framing in the library as well as severe damage to the
floor tiles in other rooms. 70 The danger of shattering glass from
warped window frames caused many teachers to keep the shades
drawn all year. In addition, the students, teachers, and staff were
potentially threatened by short-circuiting in the electrical system,
activation of the fire alarms, slippery floors, and falling ceiling
tiles. 71 Nevertheless, in April of 1979, the voters again refused to
authorize the issuance of bonds to repair the facility and to provide for
an alternate location to conduct classes until the construction was
72
complete.
In desperation, the school board petitioned the Commissioner of
Education for an order to issue the bonds and, following a hearing by
an administrative law judge, the Commissioner granted the district's
request. 73 The municipalities of Allentown and Freehold appealed to
which refused to overturn the findings
the State Board of Education,
74
of the Commissioner.

67 Id. at 269, 403 A.2d at 907. A civil action instituted against those who designed and
constructed the school is still pending. Id.
6 See notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text.
86 N.J. at 269, 430 A.2d at 907.
70 Id. at 270, 430 A.2d at 908.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7A-15 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982), the Commissioner is empowered to "order necessary budgetary changes within the school district." Id.
74 86 N.J. at 271, 430 A.2d at 908.
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Despite the Commissioner's authorization and the sanction of the
State Board, bond counsel refused to issue a favorable opinion on the
validity of the bonds because of the lack of voter approval.7 5 Consequently, the school board petitioned the appellate division for relief.
The appellate division found that the school district could not legally
appeal from the decision of the State Board since it was not disadvantaged by the Board's ruling; however, it granted a motion by the State
Board and ordered that the bonds be issued. 76 Bond counsel was still
not convinced, however, that the Commissioner and State Board
could legally circumvent the voter approval statute and the supreme
77
court granted certification to resolve the issue.
Citing the state constitutional guarantee of a thorough and efficient education, 78 Justice Pollock analyzed the Commissioner's statu79
tory duty to insure that the constitutional mandates are fulfilled.
The court found that the legislature had provided the Commissioner
with a broad spectrum of powers so that he might effectively carry out
his constitutional responsibilities. The opinion noted that the Commissioner retained the ultimate responsibility for the conduct and
operation of the schools even though the county superintendents and
local boards of education are directed to monitor the structural condition of the physical plant 8" and to equip and maintain the facilities. 8'
More importantly, the court held that the Commissioner is free to
ascertain "the amount he deems necessary to fulfill the educational
requirements of the district." 82 The court found that this statutory
power even allows the Commissioner "to appropriate additional funds
for a school budget after the budget has been rejected by the voters
83
and reduced by the governing body.
Is Id.

6 Id. at 272, 430 A.2d at 909.
Id.
id.; see note 6 supra.
I8
7 86 N.J. at 273, 430 A.2d at 909.
Id., see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7-8(b) (West 1968).
*' 86 N.J. at 278, 430 A.2d at 912; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:11-1(d) (West 1968).
82 86 N.J. at 274, 430 A.2d at 910; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:22-38 (West Cum. Supp.
1981-1982).
13 86 N.J. at 275, 430 A.2d at 910 (citing Board of Educ. v. City Council, 55 N.J. 501, 506,
262 A.2d 881, 884 (1970) and Board of Educ. v. Township Council, 48 N.J. 94, 107, 223 A.2d
481, 487 (1966)). In Board of Education v. City Council, the supreme court decided that the
Commissioner of Education could lawfully order a Type I school district to appropriate additional sums to pay for salary increases and to compensate substitute teachers. 55 N.J. at 504, 262
A.2d at 882. The court reached this conclusion even though the local authorities had excluded
these items from the school budget. The court found that, "it is the duty of the Commissioner to
see to it that every district provides a thorough and efficient school system. This necessarily
includes adequate physical facilities and educational materials, proper curriculum and staff and
77
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Justice Pollock then emphasized that the state's duty to provide a
thorough and efficient education includes not only the duty to allocate
sufficient current operating funds, but also the obligation to make
necessary capital expenditures.8 4 After noting that the legislature had

not identified voter approval as the only acceptable method for the
issuance of bonds, the court concluded that the Commissioner was
fully empowered to authorize the required funding to ameliorate the
"inadequate and inefficient" conditions at Allentown High School. 85
Justice Pollock declared: "The students and teachers of Allentown
High School have been held hostage long enough. It is now time to
'86
proceed with the repairs to the school."
The court qualified its order, however, by noting that in future
cases the Commissioner must "exercise restraint" in overriding the
voter approval requirements.8 7 Further, the court stated that the
public has a right to participate in any hearings before the Commissioner and reiterated that the Commissioner's decision is reviewable
by the courts.88 Finally, Justice Pollock emphasized that the municipalities in the Upper Freehold Regional School District would not
exceed their debt limits if they issued the contemplated bonds. The
court expressed no opinion as to whether the Commissioner could
authorize the issuance of bonds which would either cause a school

sufficient funds." Id. at 506, 262 A.2d at 883. In Board of Education v. Township Council, the
voters in a Type 11 school district had twice rejected the school budget proposed by the board of
education. Instead of certifying the amount it deemed necessary for the operation of the school
system, the township council certified to the tax board an amount significantly less than the
original budget. 48 N.J. at 98, 223 A.2d at 483. The supreme court found that the Commissioner
is empowered to "direct appropriate corrective action by the governing body or fix the budget on
his own" if he finds that the budget prepared is insufficient to enable compliance with mandatory legislative and administrative educational requirements." Id. at 107, 223 A.2d at 488. Thus,
the Commissioner of Education can order both Type I and Type II school districts to budget
additional monies for the thorough and efficient operation of the school system.
s4 86 N.J. at 275-76, 430 A.2d at 911 (citing Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. at 520. 303 A.2d at
297).
85 Id. at 279, 430 A.2d at 912-13. It is important to note that the Attorney General fully
concurs in this result as evidenced by Op. Att'y Cen. 26 (1977). In the opinion, the Attorney
General stated:
[I]t is our opinion that under the Education Clause of the State Constitution
and the Public School Education Act of 1975, the Commissioner and the State Board
are authorized to direct a local district to undertake a capital project where such a
project is deemed essential to a constitutionally mandated thorough and efficient
educational system even though the issuance of bonds for such expenditures may
have been disapproved by the voters.
Id.
86 N.J. at 280, 430 A.2d at 813.
8I

Id.

88

Id. at 279, 430 A.2d at 913.
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district to exceed its borrowing capacity or impair its plans to meet
other capital needs. 89

2. The Power of the State Commissionerof Education to Overrule the
Public
It is clear that the Commissioner of Education has been afforded
broad statutory powers to effectuate constitutional and legislative
mandates. 0 In fact, a careful examination of judicial precedent
reveals that the courts have always permitted the Commissioner a
wide range of discretion in the enforcement of educational man92
dates.91 For example, in Booker v. Plainfield Board of Education,
the court decided that the Commissioner can either order a local
school district to submit a formal plan to correct de facto segregation
or prescribe a plan of his own. 3 The court reached this result despite
the Commissioner's contention that it was beyond his authority "to
interfere with local boards in the management of their schools unless
they violate the law, act in bad faith.

. .

or abuse their discretion in a

shocking manner."9' 4 Similarly, in Jenkins v. Township of Morris
School District,5 the Commissioner was allowed to compel two municipalities to continue their reciprocal services arrangement and order them to proceed with regionalization even though his mandates
were not supported by a specific statute.96
As previously noted, the courts have also established the Commissioner's right to reinstate cuts made in a school budget by a governing
body.9 7 Plainly, this is a powerful and pervasive grant of authority.
However, according to a 1977 opinion of the Attorney General, this
power is a necessary right without which "the State would be [unable]
to compel a local district to meet its constitutional obligation." 9 8
Id. at 281, 430 A.2d at 913.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:4-21 to 4-40, :7A-9, 10, 14, 15, 22 & 29 (\Vest 1968 & Cum.
Supp. 1981-1982).
W See, e.g., In re Masiello, 25 N.J. 590, 138 A.2d 393 (1958), where the supreme court held
that the Commissioner has the power to decide all disputes and controversies arising under state
law regarding education, including the power to exercise his "independent judgment" in deter"

"

mining proper corrective action. Id. at 607, 138 A.2d at 401-02. See also Morean v. Board of
Ed., 42 N.J. 237, 200 A.2d 97 (1964) and Schults v. Board of Ed., 86 N.J. Super. 29, 205 A.2d
762 (1964), afJ'd., 45 N.J. 2, 210 A.2d 762 (1965).
92 45 N.J. 161, 212 A.2d 1 (1965).
g Id. at 178, 212 A.2d at 10.
Id. at 177, 212 A.2d at 9-10.
I4
58 N.J. 483, 279 A.2d 619 (1971).
Id. at 508, 279 A.2d at 633.

9 See note 84 supra and accompanying text.

g Op. Att'y Gen. 26 (1977).
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In short, the Commissioner of Education is entitled to utilize
forceful measures in order to compel compliance with constitutional
and statutory guidelines. The right to order municipalities to issue
bonds to finance needed capital projects is thus a logical and justifiable extension of the Commissioner's power over budgetary affairs of
school districts.
3. The Significance of Upper Freehold.
At first impression the Freehold decision might be considered a
radical break from tradition; however, a careful examination of prior
law reveals that the courts had already sanctioned several other unusual solutions to the voter approval dilemma.
First and foremost, the courts have rarely sustained taxpayer
challenges to the voting process itself, irrespective of the apparent
validity of the claims. For example, in Board of Education v. Bosco, 9
the court found that the plaintiff-taxpayers had no constitutional or
statutory right to compel the Board of Education to hold a second
election so that voters would have an opportunity to rescind their
approval of a school bond issue. 0 0 The court reached this result
despite the fact that the plaintiffs presented a petition allegedly signed
by forty-percent of the total voters qualified to vote in school district
elections.' 0
Similarly, in Citizens to Protect Public Fundsv. Board of Education,10 2 the court refused to invalidate a school bond election on the
grounds that the Board of Education had illegally allocated funds to
distribute booklets and air radio broadcasts urging voters to approve
the issuance of the bonds.' 0 3 Noting that -[e]very school district is
obligated to provide suitable school facilities and accommodations for
all children who reside in the district," the court decided that the
school board has the implicit power to make any reasonable expendi04
ture necessary to inform voters of the need for improved facilities. ,
The court stated, "[w]hen the program represents the [board's] judgment of what is required in the effective discharge of its responsibility,

0 138 N.J. Super. 368, 351 A.2d 36 (Law Div. 1975).
100 Id. at 378, 351 A.2d at 41. The court noted that it could find no statutory provision which
would "return to the people the right, by referendum or otherwise, to compel the board to even
reconsider the proposal heretofore approved by the district electors at the special election of
December 10, 1974." Id.
1o Id. at 371, 351 A.2d at 37.
102 13 N.J. 172, 98 A.2d 673 (1953).
,03 Id. at 178, 98 A.2d at 676.
10, Id. at 179, 98 A.2d at 676.
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it is not only the right but perhaps the duty of the body to endeavor to
secure the assent of the voters." 0 5
In an attempt to insure voter approval of school bond issues,
several boards of education have employed rather creative polling
practices. Suprisingly, the courts have often endorsed these atypical
election procedures.
For instance, in Kimsey v. Board of Education School Dist. No.
273,108 the Board of Education conducted the elections on the bond
issue on a Saturday. The court noted that such elections are usually
held on a Tuesday, but in the absence of any statutory or judicial
authority proscribing Saturday elections the court refused to invalidate the election results.107 In Flanagan v. Nyguist,10 8 the court
affirmed the Commissioner of Education's ruling that a school district
need not provide for absentee voting in order to comply with constitu-

tional due process mandates. 0 9

os Id. at 181, 98 A.2d at 677. See also Welsh v. Board of Educ., 7 N.J. Super. 141, 72 A.2d
350 (App. Div. 1950). In Welsh, the court dismissed an appeal brought by taxpayers demanding
a recount of votes. The court found, inter alia, that the Board of Education had given the voters
sufficient notice of the election even though the record did not indicate whether standard or
daylight saving time would be in effect. Id. at 145, 72 A.2d at 352.
"'s 211 Kan. 618, 507 P.2d 180 (1973).
107 Id. at 627, 507 P.2d at 187. The court also refused to enjoin the issuance of the bonds on
the basis that unfair campaign tactics had been used in the election. The court noted that
"unscrupulous campaign methods must be met in some other way than by an action to enjoin
issuance and sale of bonds." Id. at 630, 507 P.2d at 189 (quoting Humphrey v. City of Pratt, 93
Kan. 413, 416, 144 P. 197, 198 (1914)).
10838 A.D.2d 645, 327 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 907 (1972).
ld. at 646, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 120. Holding Saturday elections and failing to poll absent
Iy
voters are just two of the innovative strategies employed by boards of education in an attempt to
mitigate the effects of voter rejection. For other noteworthy methods for eliciting positive voter
response, see Stelzer v. Huddleston, 526 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (voters provided with
only 72 hours notice of election); Wright v. Board of Trustees, 520 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Civ. App.
1975) (informal canvassing techniques utilized). In Wright, the court refused to invalidate the
election despite charges that some of the voters were not qualified to vote, that the election
returns were not delivered to the proper party, that the poll lists were not certified in accordance
with Texas law, that the pollsters had not been adequately trained, and that some of the voting
machines had not been set at zero. 520 S.W.2d at 792-93. The court found that none of these
alleged irregularities affected the outcome of the election. Id. at 793. In Town of Groton v.
Union School Dist. No. 21, 127 Vt. 142, 241 A.2d 332 (1968), the school district had provided
three polling places when the original bond issue was presented to the voters; however, on a
subsequent election held to consider rescinding approval of the issue, votes could be cast at only
one location. Id. at 146-47, 241 A.2d at 335. The court found that the polling arrangements were
sufficient. Id. Finally, in Byron v. Timberland Regional School Dist., 113 N.H. 449, 309 A.2d
218 (1973), the bond issue in question twice failed to receive the requisite approval from
two-thirds of all voters present and voting. Nevertheless, the court found that the resolution
authorizing the issuance of bonds was validly adopted at the third election and declared that
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Clearly, then, the courts have recognized the frustration felt by
school officials who want to provide adequate facilities and equipment for their pupils but are constrained by the lack of voter approval. The Freehold decision may therefore be characterized as simply a clear and definite expression of judicial intolerance for students
"held hostage"" 0 by unsympathetic voters. Accordingly, the significance of the Freehold opinion lies in its minimization of the importance of voter approval. This new trend toward school district independence should thus encourage educational bodies to consider
alternative forms of capital funding which do not depend upon a
favorable response from the voters.
IV.

THE

NEED

FOR AN ALTERNATIVE FINANCING MErHOD

Remedial action was only taken in Upper Freehold after the
school facilities reached such a state of disrepair that the constitutional right to a thorough and efficient education was severely impaired. Given a method of financing which requires voter approval,
should the only avenue of redress be an extensive and costly appeal to
the Commissioner of Education and to the courts? The cumbersome
nature of such a process makes it appropriate to consider its inherent
problems and to examine alternative methods of financing public
school capital improvements.
A. PracticalProblems Resulting from
the Need for Voter Approval
Generally, municipal and county debt is governed by the provisions of the local bond law,"' which imposes a restriction upon the
amount of indebtedness that may be incurred." 2 This restriction is a
function of a percentage of assessed property valuations within the
municipality or county." 3 These limitations may be exceeded under

".any bonds issued pursuant thereto would be legal obligations of the district." Id. at 457, 309
A.2d at 223. Indeed, the only practice which is routinely condemned by the courts is failing to
provide notice of changes in voting district boundaries at least twenty-one days prior to the
election. See Lambert v. Unified School Dist. No. 237, 204 Kan. 381, 461 P.2d 744 (1969) (for

notice of bond election to be effective after change in boundary lines, publication must occur at
least twenty-one days prior to election).
110 Freehold, 86 N.J. at 280, 430 A.2d at 913.
"I N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:2-1 to 64 (West 1980 & Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
112 Id. § 40A:2-6 (West 1980).
113Id.
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certain circumstances with the consent of the local finance board; 1 4
however, up to the limit there are no requirements for voter approval." 5 It is left to the governing body to determine when, how
much, and for what purpose indebtedness is incurred." 8 If their
judgment is poor, or if prudence is not observed, the governing body
will pay at the polls. Thus, the requirement of voter approval for
Type II school debt is the exception, not the rule, for the issuance of
obligations in New Jersey.
Within limits, this type of flexibility is desirable. The planning
and financing of substantial capital projects is an involved process.
From the initial design stage, scores of professionals such as architects,
engineers, and attorneys are involved. Once a project is reviewed and
approved, financing may take place in a variety of ways. It may be
determined that interim financing should be followed until the project
is complete, at which time it will be permanently funded through the
issuance of long-term debt." 7 Under existing legal schemes, the municipality through its governing body will make these determinations.""
The requirement of voter approval injects significant uncertainty
into the process. Before a particular project can be placed before the
voters for their consideration, much of the initial planning and preparation must be accomplished. The size and scope of the project must
be established and relative costs must be determined." 9 At the preccise juncture in the process when the normal practice would be to
obtain financing, finalize plans and specifications, advertise for bids,
and let contracts, the project is instead halted and placed before the
voters. If the project is approved, then the normal pace of events may
resume: financing can be secured, construction begun, and a finished
project presented to the ultimate users. If the project is rejected by the
voters, then the process is abruptly halted. If there has not been a
proper determination as to the relative need of the project, that is, if
"'

Id. § 40A:2-7(d). The local finance board may consent if it determines that the amount

sought is in the public interest and will not "materially impair" the municipality's or county's
credit or ability to repay its debts. Id. (The term "local government board" as used in the statute
is synonomous with "local finance board." Id. § 52:27BB-2 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982)). N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 40A:2-7 (West 1980) sets forth additional exceptions to debt limitations, particularly in the event of emergencies.
"
See id. § 40A:2-1 to 64 (West 1980 & Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
"
See id.§ 40A:2-3 ('West 1980).
17 Id. § 40A:2-8.
"IId.

See id. § 18A:24-24 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982) for the required form of a proposal to
issue school bonds.
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the voters are "correct," then an end to the process may be appropriate. Conversely, if a valid need exists, then the government officials
are left with a dilemma: should they redesign the project and alter its
scope in order to bring its cost down, thereby increasing the likelihood
of voter approval; or should they embark upon a public relations
campaign in the hope that the voters will approve the issue after
learning more about the project? In the meantime, of course, several
factors crucial to the completion of the project will have changed.
Because of the inevitable inflation in the cost of construction projects
the total cost of the finished project may be substantially higher than
originally planned. 120 In addition, conditions in the credit markets
may have become so adverse that the interest cost on the debt is
significantly higher. There are many instances of projects which are
designed, planned, placed before the voters, and in some cases approved, but which must be abandoned because the amount of time
necessary to go through this process has rendered the price estimate
obsolete. Whatever arguments one may make in favor of the policy of
voter approval, one cannot help but question whether it is conducive
to a flexible and efficient method of financing capital improvements.
B. Utilization of County Improvement Authorities
to Finance Public School Facilities
Under existing New Jersey law, municipalities, counties, and
other political subdivisions are not limited to their ability to finance
under the local bond law with respect to the acquisition of capital
assets. Under the County Improvement Authorities Law,' 21 counties
may create authorities 22 for the purpose of providing public facilities
within the county. 23 The Law empowers such authorities to construct and lease various types of "public facilities" to either the county
24
or municipalities and other governmental units within the county.'
This method of financing has been used to provide a variety of capital
improvements for use by municipalities, counties, and the state. 2 5
An analysis of the County Improvement Authorities Law should be
120For example, in Upper Freehold Township the cost of the repairs to the school escalated to
an amount nearly two-thirds greater than the original estimate. 86 N.J. at 280, 430 A.2d at 913.
2 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:37A-1 to 135 (West 1967 & Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
122 Id. § 40:37A-46 (West 1967).
'23 Id. § 40:37A-54 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). County improvement authorities were

authorized so that each county could, inter alia, construct public buildings, improve public
transportation, develop aviation facilities, update sewage and waste disposal systems, provide
loans for redevelopment, and increase the middle and low income housing stock. id.
12, Id. § 40:37A-54(d).
125

Id.
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made to determine whether this long-accepted method of financing
could be utilized to provide public school facilities.
The ability of school districts to enter into lease financing arrangements with a county improvement authority depends upon two
determinations. First, it must be established that school districts are in
fact governmental entities with which county improvement authorities may enter into lease arrangements. Second, it is essential to determine whether the restrictive provisions relating to school district lease
powers would permit a viable lease financing arrangement.
County improvement authorities were created in order to insure
the "provision within the county of public buildings for use by the
state, county, or any municipality in the county, or any two or more
or any subdivisions, departments, agencies, or instrumentalities of any
of the foregoing." 126 To achieve this goal, authorities are empowered
"to lease such public facilities to any county, municipality, governmental unit or person." 127 "Governmental unit" is defined to include
"the state, or any county or municipality or any subdivision, department, agency or instrumentality heretofore or hereafter created, designated or8 established by or for. . . the state or any county or munici2
pality."1
In Botkin v. Westwood,'29 the Borough of Westwood sought to
poll the voters on the issue of school district deconsolidation. In holding that the borough was not entitled to take this course of action, the
court declared:
In New Jersey, school districts of whatever classification,
though co-terminus with municipal boundaries, . . . are, and have
been for more than half a century, local governmental units, governed by a board of education. They are separate, distinct and free
from the control of the municipal governing body except to the
extent our education law provides. 3 0
In numerous other decisions and attorney general opinions it has been
clearly determined that school districts are created pursuant to, and
derive their powers from, state law and that they are separate and
distinct political subdivisions of the state.' 3' It is equally clear from
126 Id. § 40A:37A-54(a).
27 Id. § 40:37A-78 (West 1967).
128 Id. § 40:37A-45(k) (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
11052 N.J. Super. 416, 145 A.2d 618 (App. Div.), app. dismissed, 28 N.J. 218, 146 A.2d 121

(1958).
130Id. at 425, 145 A.2d at 623 (citations omitted).
131Fair Lawn Educ. Ass'n v. Fair Lawn Bd. of Educ., 79 N.J. 574, 579, 401 A.2d 681, 683
(1979) ("Local boards of education are creations of the State and, as such, may exercise only
those powers granted to them by the legislature-either expressly or by necessary or fair implica-
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an analysis of the County Improvement Authorities Law that school
districts are "subdivisions" of the state within the meaning of that

Law and as such are authorized to enter into lease financing arrangements with county improvement authorities in order to effectuate the

purposes of the Law. 3 2 In view of the broad definitional provisions
of the County Improvement Authorities Law, it would indeed be a
narrow and restrictive reading of that Law to conclude that school
districts did not fall within the class of entities for which county
improvement authorities may construct public facilities and with
which such authorities may enter into lease agreements.
Having determined that school districts may enter into lease
arrangements with county improvement authorities, it is necessary to
ascertain that the terms of such leases would not be subject to the
restrictions under which school districts normally operate.
The state has invested school districts with a limited range of

leasing powers. Type II districts may rent buildings for school purposes without voter approval on a year-to-year basis, or, in an emergency, for a term not to exceed five years.133 In all other situations,

any school district may "lease for a term not exceeding 50 years" land

or buildings needed for school purposes. 13 4 In the case of Type II
school districts without a board of estimate, the law indicates that any

such long term leases require voter approval. 35

The County Improvement Authorities Law, on the other hand,
purports to give an authority, and any entity entering into a lease with

such authority, broad powers with respect to the terms and provisions
that such lease may contain. For example, the lease may be entered
into for any term or an unlimited term, it may be with or without
tion."); Board of Educ. v. Bosco, 138 N.J. Super. 368, 374, 351 A.2d 36, 39 (Law Div. 1975)
(legislature established educational system through creation of political subdivisions such as local
boards of education). See also Op. Att'y Gen. 28 (1976), which states that "'[li]ocal boards of
education are political subdivisions created by the legislature and empowered by it to provide,
maintain and supervise local school districts."
132N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:37A-78 (West 1967).
133 Id. § 18A:20-4.1(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
134Id. § 18A:20-4.2(c) (emphasis added). The law provides that the terms of any lease which
is to exceed one year must be approved by the Commissioner of Education and the local finance
board in the Department of Community Affairs. Id. § 18A:20-4.2(d).
135Id. However, the Attorney General has indicated that an election is not necessary when the
acquisition is to be entirely financed by federal funds. In Op. Att'y Gen. 28 (1976), he stated that
"where school construction is entirely financed by grant moneys, voter approval would not be a
necessary element in the authorization of such project. These projects would be properly authorized by appropriate board action following the receipt of the requisite approvals for school
construction." Id. at 3. The Attorney General also noted that "[T]his conclusion does not
concern Type I school districts, or type I districts with boards of school estimate since such
districts are not required by statute to obtain voter approval for construction projects under any
circumstances." Id. at 4.
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consideration, and it is a valid and binding obligation on the parties
whether or not the governmental units in question have made the

necessary appropriations to pay the lease payments prior to its authorization. 13 Furthermore, an entity entering into such a lease with a
county improvement authority is directed to do any and all things
necessary to provide for the "payment or discharge of any obligation
thereunder in the same manner as other obligations" of such govern-

mental entity. 37 Although there are no cases construing this particular provision, virtually identical language in the County and Munici-

pal Utilities Authorities Law 38 has been subject to review by the
courts.
In Graziano v. Mayor & Township Committee,139 taxpayer

plaintiffs challenged the legality of a sewer service contract entered
into between the Township of Montville and the Montville Township
Municipal Utilities Authority (MUA). Under the terms of the contract
the municipality agreed to pay any deficit that might result if the

MUA failed to charge users for the full debt service and operating
costs incurred in connection with the MUA's sewer system .140 Judge
Botter took notice of the "sweeping terms" of the County and Municipal Utilities Authorities Law which provided that service contracts

between an MUA and a municipality could be made on any terms and
conditions approved by the municipality, for a specified or unlimited
time, and that they would be valid whether or not an appropriation
with respect thereto were made by the governmental unit prior to
authorization of the contract.' 4 ' The court was faced with the di-

lemma of reconciling these "sweeping terms" with more general stat'8 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:37A-78 (West 1967).
137 Id.

1 Id. § 40:14B-1 to 69 (West 1967 & Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
IN 162 N.J. Super. 552, 394 A.2d 103 (App. Div.), certif. denied. 79 N.J. 462, 401 A.2d

(1978).
110162 N.J. Super. at 556-57, 394 A.2d at 105. The court found support for its position by
analogizing the municipal utilities authority system to that of the State Building Authority. Id. at
562, 394 A.2d at 107-08. In McCutcheon v. State Bldg. Auth., 13 N.J. 46, 97 A.2d 663 (1953),
the court found that the building authority could not constitutionally issue bonds and construct
buildings which were then to be leased back to pay the debt service. Id. at 63, 97 A.2d at 671.
Justices Jacobs and Brennan dissented because they felt that rent due in the future could not be
considered a present liability of the State. Id. at 71, 97 A.2d at 676 (Jacobs, J. & Brennan, J._
dissenting). In fact, the dissenting view is now the controlling position as evidenced by several
recent opinions. See City of Camden v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 133, 153, 411 A.2d 462, 473 (1980) (court
refused to compel legislature to allocate funds to municipalities and counties on permanent basis
as this would convert applicable statutes into "debts' binding upon future legislatures"); Holster
v. Board of Trustees, 59 N.J. 60, 71, 279 A.2d 798, 804 (1971) ("projected or anticipated future
legislature appropriation not a present debt or liability"); Clayton v. Kervick, 52 N.J. 138, 155,
244 A.2d 281, 290 (1968) (Educational Facilities Authority plan to issue bonds for construction
and lease of buildings for higher education not violative of constitutional debt limitations).
"1 162 N.J. Super. at 561, 394 A.2d at 107.
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utes which regulate the fiscal affairs of municipalities. For example,
the court noted "normally, municipal contracts cannot be made for

more than one year because provisions of the local budget law ...
forbid expending funds and incurring obligations for which no appropriations had been made." 42 The court took further notice of provisions of the local public contracts law which limit the duration of

contracts,14 3 and provisions of the local bond law which limit the
44

amount of indebtedness that a municipality may incur.
In upholding the validity of the service contract in question, the
court stated that the specific provisions of the Municipal and County
Utilities Authorities Law controlled the subject matter of the contract

in question to the exclusion of general provisions of other laws governing debt limitations and contract requirements. 45 The court concluded that the County and Municipal Utilities Authorities Law "validly authorized the Township to take on obligations to the MUA that
are limited only by the good sense and fiduciary responsibility of the
46
Township's officers."
Judge Botter's reasoning in the Graziano decision is equally applicable to lease arrangements entered into pursuant to the County
Improvement Authorities Law. The purpose of the Law is specific
and the provisions relating to lease powers are broad. It is reasonable
to conclude, therefore, that a court would adopt the reasoning set
forth in Graziano and hold that the provisions of the County Improvement Authorities Law would permit an authority and a school district
to enter into a long-term, unconditional lease financing arrangement,
notwithstanding the restrictions governing school district lease powers
47
generally. 1
4
'4
'"

d. at 563-64, 394 A.2d at 108-09 (citing N.J.

141 162
146

STAT. ANN.

§ 40A:4-57 (West 1980)).

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:11-15 (West 1980).
Id. § 40A:2-6.
N.J. Super. at 564, 394 A.2d at 109.

Id.

'17The budgetary planning and approval process for Type II school districts without a board
of estimate is rather complicated. Annually, the Board of Education must prepare a budget. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 18A:22-7 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). The items of expenditure and revenue
which must be set forth in the budget are set out by law in great detail. Id. § 18A:22.8. Upon
preparation of the budget the Board of Education must hold a public hearing. Id. § 18A:22-10 to
13 (West 1968 & Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). At or after the public hearing on the budget, but not
later than 12 days prior to the election, the Board must fix the amount of money to be voted
upon at the annual election, and this sum must be designated in the election notice. Id. §
18A:22-32 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). The budget is then submitted to the voters at the
annual school election. Id. § 18A:22-33.
It should be noted, however, that the amount necessary to pay interest and debt redemption
charges on outstanding debt of the school district is not voted upon, but is certified to the county
board of taxation, together with the amounts approved at the budget election. The total
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Although the County Improvement Authorities Law has not yet
been employed to provide financing for public school facilities, it is a
viable alternative to the present financing system.14 8 It is helpful to
illustrate the exact means by which this potential method of financing
would be utilized.
Assume that a particular county has created a county improvement authority. Within that county is a school district which desires
to replace an obsolete building with a new and expanded public
education facility which will both meet the needs of existing students
and provide room for expected growth in the population. The school

amounts so certified must be included in the taxes assessed, levied, and collected in the municipality or municipalities comprising the school district. Id. Assuming the budget is approved, then
the amounts in the budget are certified to the county and must be assessed, levied, and raised in
the municipality or municipalities composing the district. Id. § 18A:22-34. If the budget is
rejected by the voters or if any part of the budget is rejected, then the Board of Education must
deliver the proposed budget to the governing body of the municipality or municipalities included
within the district. The governing body of each municipality in the district must, after consultation with the Board of Education, determine the amount which, in its judgment, is necessary to
be appropriated for each item appearing in the budget "to provide a thorough and efficient
system of schools in the district" and must certify to the County Board of Taxation the totals of
the amount so determined to be necessary. Id. § 18A:22-37. If the Board of Education disagrees
with the amount certified by such governing body or bodies, it may appeal the municipality's
determination to the Commissioner of Education. Id. If the governing body of any municipality
within the district fails to certify the amount determined by them to be necessary for any item
rejected at the annual school election, then the Commissioner shall determine the amount or
amounts which in his judgment are necessary to be appropriated. The amount so certified must
be included in the taxes to be assessed, levied, and collected in any such municipality. Id. §
18A:22-38.
14 It is interesting to note that the State of Pennsylvania already employs the concept of lease
financing in the construction of public school facilities. Under the terms of the State Public
School Building Authority Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 791.1-17 (Purdon 1962 & Cum.Supp.
1981-1982), the state created an authority "for the purpose of constructing, improving, maintaining and operating, buildings for public school and educational broadcasting facilities and
furnishing and equipping the same for use as part of the public school system." Id. § 791.4
(Purdon Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
The authority issues bonds, constructs the facilities, and then leases them back to the
individual districts. See id. § 791.4(h) & (i) (Purdon 1962). The authority cannot pledge the
credit or taxing power of the state as security for the bonds but instead secures the debt by
pledging rental revenues received from the leasing districts. Id. § 791.4(n) & (i).
The Pennsylvania courts have fully endorsed this lease financing scheme. In Creenhalgh v.
Woolworth, 361 Pa. 543, 64 A.2d 659 (1949), the state supreme court found that the school
district's 30 year lease of a building constructed by the state building authority did not violate the
debt limitation clause of the state constitution even though title to the building would be
surrendered to the school district at the end of the lease. Id. at 556-57, 64 A.2d at 666. Similarly,
in Bentley v. Conneaut Twp. School Dist., 35 Erie 67, 82 Pa. D. & C. 267 (1953), the court
found that construction of a building by the authority could continue where the lease rentals had
to be slightly increased due to higher construction costs.
Clearly, then, the State of Pennsylvania has found lease financing to be an effective way to
comply with its constitutional mandate for a thorough and efficient education. See PA. CONST.
art. II, § 14.
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district has approached the authority with a plan for constructing a
new facility. The authority issues its bonds 49 and uses the proceeds to
construct a new facility for the school district. The facility is leased to
the school district for a term which is coterminus with the maturity
date of the bond issue. The lease payments payable to the county
improvement authority are equivalent to the principal and interest
payments on the bond issue and are in fact applied to meet such
payments. 50 At the end of the lease term and upon payment of the
bonds, title to the facility passes to the school district. The terms of the
lease are absolute. The school district promises to pay without setoff
or counterclaim an amount equal to the debt service requirements of
the authority's bond issue. The school district promises in the lease to
make all budgetary and other provisions in order to provide sufficient
funds to meet its obligations under the lease. This means that the
school district will include an amount at least sufficient to make such
payments as its proportionate share of the municipal tax levy.' 5' In
the event that the school district fails to make the required payments,
the improvement authority's option will be to evict the school district
from the building and to utilize whatever other landlord-tenant remedies are available to it.

52

The advantages of this financing method are apparent. First, the
school district itself is not burdened with the obligation to enter the
public credit markets in order to obtain sufficient funds. The improvement authority, which in many cases will have ready access to
the market, undertakes this obligation. It may even be agreed that the
improvement authority will assume the responsibility for actually
constructing the facility, thereby eliminating the need for the school
district to become involved in this phase of the project. In effect, thes3
method of financing can be fashioned as a "turnkey" endeavor.'
Another advantage is that the county improvement authority will be
permitted to sell its bonds on a negotiated basis as opposed to a public
sale. This means that the authority will be working with an experienced investment banker throughout the course of the financing,
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:37A-118 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
"'o See, e.g., Clayton v. Kervick, 52 N.J. 138, 141-42, 244 A.2d 281, 282-83 (1968).
"'1 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:22-34 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
152 Other remedies available to the authority are codified in the County Improvement Authority Law. See id. § 40:37A-68.1 (county improvement authority may enter into contract or
14

agreement to meet deficiencies in revenues provided that it obtains approval of director of
division of loan government services); id. § 40:37A-129 (authority can obtain insurance for

payment of interest or principal, or both, from any department or agency of United States).
153 A turnkey project is one in which a developer completes construction without governmental assistance and turns the keys over to the authority upon completion. Lehigh Constr. Co. v.
Housing Auth., 56 N.J. 447, 480, 267 A.2d 41, 46 (1970).
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which in many cases will result in a more advantageous financial
structure for the project than could be obtained in the rather limited
public bid procedures which a Type II school district would have to
follow in the sale of its bonds. 4 Of course, the county improvement
authority could also employ a public sale method if this were deemed
to be more desirable. The flexibility which the authority could provide should not be underestimated. In fact, the only disadvantage of
the lease financing method is that there might be slightly higher
transaction costs with respect to the actual financing itself.
There are a number of creative ideas which could be utilized
when financing public school facilities through a county improvement
authority. Perhaps the most useful techniques are made possible by
the natural economies of scale which authority financing produces.
A county improvement authority active in the area of public
school financing could arrange such financing for a number of different school districts within its geographical boundaries under a "pooling" method of financing. This means that the authority would finance facilities for a variety of municipalities and school districts,
perhaps with a single bond issue. The lease payments from the various
school districts and municipalities would be "pooled" to provide one
unified flow of revenue for the payment of debt service. This could
make the bond issue more attractive to investors since the security for
the issue would not be a single governmental entity. Rather, the "risk"
would be spread over a number of different lessees. Less prosperous
school districts might benefit from this risk-spreading effect because
one "bad" credit would have less impact than if the financing were
done on an individual basis. Consequently, the ability of poorer
school districts to comply with the constitutional mandate of a thorough and efficient education could be enhanced. While investors and
bond rating agencies might evaluate a pooled financing on the basis of
the worst risk, such a result could be mitigated by employing alternate
security mechanisms permitted under the County Improvement Authorities Law.
In addition to authorizing lease agreements between an authority
and the county or municipality, the County Improvement Authorities
Law permits counties and municipalities to agree to "appropriate
moneys for the purposes of the authority, and to loan or donate such
money to the authority in such installments and upon such terms as
may be agreed upon with the authority." 5 5 This method could be
employed to provide a backup security to the obligation of the school
Is4

'5

N.J.

STAT. ANN. §

18A:24-36 (West 1968).

Id. § 40:37A-79 (West 1967).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:195

district to make lease payments to the county improvement authority.
This transfer of credit from the municipality or county would certainly enhance the security of the bond issue. This security could be
arranged either on an individual basis with the municipality in which
the school district was contained or possibly through a county-wide
arrangement under which the county agreed to make up any deficiencies in debt service requirements caused by the default of one or more
participating school districts.
An additional security mechanism is the use of commercial insurance for the purpose of providing a guarantee of debt incurred to
finance public school improvements.' 56 The Municipal Bond Insurance Association (MBIA) and the American Municipal Bond Assurance Corporation (AMBAC) are well-known entities which provide
insurance for municipal bond issues. 57 These organizations are
widely used in connection with the marketing of bond issues which
might not otherwise be marketable at an acceptable rate of interest.158 Of course, premium expenses are a significant cost and the
relative advantage of such an insurance program would have to be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis with competent financial advisory
assistance.
In summary, the County Improvement Authorities Law could be
utilized to provide financing for public school facilities. Issuing bonds
through the authority would afford school districts access to creative
marketing techniques and sophisticated security mechanisms. In addition, the flexible nature of the lease financing transaction would allow
the school districts to enter the credit market more readily than they
are able to under the present system.
C. Policy Considerations
The financing of public school facilities by county improvement
authorities through the issuance of revenue bonds is no doubt a more
liberal method of financing and significant public policy questions are
apparent. Any alternative financing method which obviates the need
for voter approval arguably constitutes an evasion of a "right" of the
'sO See, e.g., id. § 40:37A-129 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). This statute empowers the
county improvement authorities to obtain insurance or guarantees from any department or
agency of the federal government. Id.
'5 Standard & Poor's grants AMBAC and MBIA insured bonds an AAA rating. R. LAMB & S.
RAPPAPORr, MUNICIPAL BONDS 318 (1980). See also PUBLIC SECURITIES ASSOCIATION, FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 64 (1st ed. 1981).
'I See B. LAMB & S. RAPPAPOrr, supra note 157, at 317. "These issues do not need insurance
in order to gain their rating or be sold; however, the intent is to enable good and solid issuers...
to find a wider, more national market and to help reduce their interest cost." Id.

1982]

PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING

223

voting public to approve or reject such projects.15 9 Similar arguments
have been attempted in the past, but have been rejected by the New

Jersey courts.

10

These disputes involved attempts by the state to

acquire capital facilities through a lease financing mechanism. It was

argued that the state could not enter into a long-term obligation to
finance capital improvements because such an obligation would constitute an indebtedness of the state. Since indebtedness of the state can
only be incurred after approval by the voters, such a lease financing
scheme was alleged to constitute an unconstitutional evasion of this
requirement.' 0 ' This argument was rejected by the New Jersey courts

and the validity of the lease financing mechanism was upheld. In
these cases, however, the lease obligation was not unconditional, but
' When the framers wrote the United States Constitution there were clearly defined areas
which were considered to be appropriate for the voters. See, e.g.. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, & 2, cl. I
("The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the
People of theseveral States .... "); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, modified on other grounds,
411 U.S. 922 (1973) (Constitution commands that representatives be chosen by people); Kirkpatrick v. Priesler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) (in congressional election one man's vote must be worth as
much as another's). Certain matters, however, were deemed too important to be subject to the
desires of the majority and were written into the Constitution for the express purpose of
preventing their later repeal by the populace. See, e.g., U.S. CONsr. amend. I; Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (purpose of first amendment is to protect
free discussion of governmental affairs); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (government may
not aid religions even if it attempts to aid all religions equally). In New Jersey there is a
recognized right to a thorough and efficient education. See notes 6-43 supra and accompanying
text. Although it is apparent that the legislature and the framers of the state constitution
intended that this constitutional mandate be effectuated through the local school boards, it
would indeed be anomolous to conclude that their intent was to provide a "'thorough and
efficient education" only if the voters so approve. Accordingly, the right of the voting public to
approve or reject school bond issues must be afforded a degree of importance which does not
impair the students' right to receive an adequate education.

160See note 161 infra.
16 See, e.g.. Holster v. Board of Trustees, 59 N.J. 60, 279 A.2d 798 (1971), which held that
the County College Bond Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:64-1 to 29 (Cum. Supp. 1981-1982), did
not violate the debt limitation clause of the New Jersey Constitution, N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § II,
para. 3, because no legislature can bind a future body to approve specific appropriations.
Consequently, since future legislatures are not bound to appropriate funds, the expected or
anticipated debt cannot be deemed to be a present liability of the State. 59 N.J. at 71, 279 A.2d
at 804. But see McCutcheon v. State Bldg. Auth., 13 N.J. 46, 97 A.2d 663 (1953), which found
that future payments do violate the constitutional debt limitation. The Holster court noted that
the McCutcheon opinion "retains little vitality today." 59 N.J. at 73, 97 A.2d at 805. Further, in
Clayton v. Kervick, 52 N.J. 138, 244 A.2d 281 (1968), the court reached an analogous result in
upholding the Educational Facilities Authority Law. The Clayton court also noted that lease
financing has been approved by courts in many other jurisdictions. 52 N.J. at 154, 244 A.2d at
289 (citing McArthur v. SmaUwood, 225 Ark. 328,281 S.W.2d 428 (1955) (state office building);
Berger v. Howlett, 25 lll.2d 128, 182 N.E.2d 673 (1962) (state hospital and penitentiary
complex); State v. Board of Regents, 167 Kan. 587, 207 P.2d 373 (1949) (state armories); In re
Board of Pub. Bldgs., 363 S.W.2d 598 (Mo. 1963) (state office buildings); In re Okla. Capitol
Improvement Auth., 410 P.2d 46 (Okla. 1966) (financing buildings for public safety department); In re Okla. Capital Improvement Auth., 355 P.2d 1028'(Okla. 1960) (state office
building); State v. Giessel, 271 Wis. 15, 72 N.W.2d 377 (1955) (state office building, gymnasium, university, dormitories)).
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was subject to annual appropriations by the state legislature, 6

2

and

was, in effect, a year-to-year obligation. The courts did not reach the
question of whether a long term lease which was not conditional upon
future appropriations would be in conflict with the voter approval
requirement. Thus, it is unclear whether a New Jersey court would
permit the independent lease power grant in the County Improvement Authorities Law to override the general requirement that Type
II school districts obtain voter approval prior to entering into long
63
term leases.1
Moreover, while it is arguable under Graziano that the County
Improvement Authorities Law would take precedence over the statutes defining school districts' lease powers, it is questionable whether
there is sufficient authority for bond counsel to issue an opinion
"2 See Holster v. Board of Trustees, 59 N.J. 60, 279 A.2d 798 (1971) and Clayton v. Kervick,
52 N.J. 138, 244 A.2d 281 (1968), which held that the legislature must annually appropriate the
funds to make the annual lease payments. In other words, the legislature is not legally bound to
automatically provide the required funds. Unlike the state legislature, however, local boards of
education do have the power to take actions which will bind future acting bodies. Rail v. Board
of Educ., 104 N.J. Super. 236, 249 A.2d 616 (App. Div. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 54 N.J.
273 (1969). In Rail, the court found that since the legislature had empowered school boards to set
tenure requirements shorter than the statutory minimum, it impliedly intended the decisions of
one board to continue beyond the life of that board. Id. at 244, 249 A.2d at 620. The court cited
other statutes which specifically indicate that a school board may enter into contracts or
agreements that will bind future acting bodies. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:29-4.1 (West
1968) (salary schedule binds adopting and future boards for two years after date of adoption); id.
§ 18A:27-3 (West 1968) (teacher employment contracts binding until June 30); id. § 18A:39-2
(West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982) (school transportation contract to run for four years). Consequently, it is quite apparent that the lease financing arrangement between one school board and
a county improvement authority would be binding upon future acting boards. Furthermore,
should a future school board fail to include the requisite lease payments in its budget the
Commissioner of Education could order a budgetary increase sufficient to cover the payments.
See notes 78-83 supra and accompanying text.
163 There is one other way which the lease financing transaction could be structured. As
previously noted, municipalities are clearly empowered to enter into leases within county
improvement authorities. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:37A-78 (West 1967). Furthermore, municipalities may acquire real or personal property "in trust for, on behalf of, or as agent for, any other
political subdivision or body corporate and politic" of the state. Id. § 40A:12-20 (West 1980).
Significantly, a municipality may convey land or buildings to any county, local, regional or
consolidated board of education that plans to use the property for educational purposes. Id. §
40A:12-19. The law also indicates that only a nominal consideration need be paid for the
property and does not specify a particular manner in which the conveyance must be executed.
Id.
Accordingly, a municipality could enter into a lease financing transaction with a county
improvement authority for the benefit of a local school district. The municipality could obligate
itself under the lease on an unconditional basis and sublease the facility to the school district on a
year-to-year basis. This arrangement would avoid any possible conflict with the voter approval
requirements and would result in a secure, and therefore marketable, lease financing structure.
Ordinarily, municipalities may not make expenditures which exceed the limitations set
forth in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:4-45.1 to 45.5 (West 1980). Significantly, however, the County
Improvement Authorities Law was recently amended to provide that lease payments allocable to
debt service on County Improvement Authority bonds issued to finance a facility in the county or
municipality are exempted from the limitations in increasing appropriations. See N.J. STAT.
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approving the use of lease financing. Nevertheless, the dire need for
alternative sources of capital and the extreme utility of this financing
method create the perfect conditions for a test case.
Furthermore, it is quite clear that school districts must comply
with the constitutional mandate set forth in Robinson. The school
boards are faced with a true Hobson's choice: should they accept voter
rejection of bond issues and risk being sued for failing to provide a
thorough and efficient education or should they seek alternative
methods of financing which are not dependant upon voter approval?
Plainly, this is a serious dilemma which many New Jersey school
64
boards must soon resolve.1
CONCLUSION

The right to a thorough and efficient education is clearly being
jeopardized by the inadequacies of many public school facilities; however, without voter approval school boards are unable to issue bonds
to finance the needed repairs. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has
indicated that the voter approval requirement may be relaxed when
the need for capital improvements is great. In effect, the court has
decided that students must be provided with a thorough and efficient
education even when the voters refuse to authorize the funding
needed to achieve that objective.
Accordingly, given the supreme court's commitment to adequate
educational facilities it is appropriate to examine alternative, more
efficient methods of financing. Issuing bonds through a county improvement authority is one method which could be employed. This
type of lease financing is a cost effective, reasonable alternative which
would provide school districts with a flexible approach to the school
financing dilemma. More importantly, it would help school districts
to fulfill their constitutional responsibility to provide a thorough and
efficient education.
§ 40:37A-56.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983). Thus, the financing of facilities through a
county improvement authority would not result in a financial or budgetary disadvantage to a
municipality.
' In fact, in Galloway Township, New Jersey, the school board is faced with precisely this
problem. In September of 1981 a referendum asking voters to approve the construction of a $7
million middle school was narrowly defeated despite months of campaigning by school board
officials. The Press, Sept. 29, 1981, at 19, col. 1. The referendum was the eighth or ninth time
since 1967 that the school board had asked residents to approve construction of a new school.
Id., Sept. 21, 1981, at 17, col. 3. During this time the cost of the proposed facility more than
tripled. Id. The superintendent of schools indicated that the board would either seek approval at
a second election or petition the Commissioner of Education for an order to issue the bonds as
was done in Upper Freehold Township. Id., Sept. 29, 1981, at 19, col. 1. The school superintendent opined that the Commissioner would "have no choice but to order the district to build
the school" since the state has rated local facilities as "inadequate" because of overcrowding. Id.
The school official expressed concern over possible lawsuits by parents who feel that Galloway
Township is not providing their children with a proper education. Id.
ANN.

